Free speech and political extremism: How nasty are we free to be? by Cohen, Carl
CARL C O H E N  
F R E E  S P E E C H  A N D  P O L I T I C A L  E X T R E M I S M :  
H O W  N A S T Y  A R E  W E  F R E E  T O  BE?* 
I want to discuss the limits of freedom in speaking and publishing: 
what they are, and what they should be. I want to ask you and myself 
about the frontiers, the extremes, the uses of speech that seem barely 
tolerable, about uses of  freedom that are, in fact, intolerable to many. 
I am not thinking merely about controversial speech. That's easy. Or 
agitating speech. That's not very hard. I am thinking about speech that 
is nasty, vicious, wrongheaded, and downright evil or at least thought 
to be so. I am not sure what content or manner meets that description. 
We all know that when two parties are in bitter, mortal conflict, each 
one thinks the other is evil, nasty and morally wrong. 
As an example, consider the war between Iran and Iraq recently in 
progress. Each party finds the other utterly vicious. But, you say, that is 
war! Right. We want to think about freedom within a civil society, a 
society divided, perhaps, even angry and bitter, but still civil. How far 
may speech go in such a setting? What is permissible? 
Consider another example, within a civil society, closer to our 
target. In Miami, on Biscayne Boulevard, in March of 1986, there was a 
confrontation between a group of anti-Contra demonstrators, and a 
group of pro-Contra demonstrators - groups whose members detest 
and revile one another, as you know. [Note: The double negative "anti- 
Contra" sounds silly, but in this case is not readily avoidable; I use it for 
the sake of accuracy.] One of the pro-Contra folks was waving a plac- 
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ard at one of the anti-Contra speakers which read: "[So-and-sol is a 
bigot..." and then added more about Nicaragua. It was a nasty sign, 
and the police asked him to stop waving it. He replied, according to 
the lengthy report in The Miami Herald, "On top of that, he's an SOB" 
and then he added "They say in war and love everything is permitted. 
And this is war!" 
Let's think about this situation briefly, to learn from it. We may 
accept the premise about war, although it may be overstated; there are 
laws and rules governing warfare, too. In war, let us assume, no holds 
are barred. But, in that conflict of demonstrators, could nastiness in 
speech be justifled by a state of war? Surely not. We were then, and we 
are now, not at war. In war we shoot and kill. Here in Miami we are in 
a civil society, seeking to govern ourselves, although divided, with 
order and fairness, and aiming to live decently. 
Nothing is to be gained by saying: The rules are offl No rules! That 
simply makes brutes of us all. In that way we return ourselves to the 
animal world. I remember a sort of chant I learned, long ago, from my 
Spanish teacher at Miami High, in which the final line (if I recall 
correctly) was a petition to Santa Maria, to deliver us all from the reign 
of the animals. The philosophically interesting and politically interest- 
ing question is: What speech is permitted when the rules are on ? 
Now that pro-Contra demonstrator was wrong to justify his nasty 
words by the claims of war. But he was not necessarily wrong in 
seek[ing to justify his words within the rules. I do not address the merits 
of the argument - which side is right, whether anyone in the con- 
troversy is or was a bigot or an SOB. This is not my concern here, 
plainly. But saying such things of another demonstrator, or of the other 
group (that they are bigots, etc.) - is that permissible? Or should the 
police have taken away his sign? 
I will put my cards on the table: I think that that particular speech 
was within the rules. The rules permit it, the good rules of a good 
society, the rules that protect speech and the freedom to speak to the 
furthest limit in a democratic civil community. 
I will defend here an old, sound, conservative proposition: in the 
realm of political speech, no content, no nastiness, no stupidity or evil, 
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may be silenced. Even when we are convinced, to the bot tom of our 
souls, that what they are saying is awful and ugly, we must protect their 
saying. That  is the glory of  a free society. 
The argument defending this conclusion I am going to pursue with 
you in some detail. But I don't  want to do that in the context of the 
pro-Contra/anti-Contra conflict. That's almost too easy, because we 
are all well aware that that conflict is a political one, and one on which 
there really are two sides, both vigorously argued. So I want to trans- 
pose the case into one that is harder, and one in which we (very proba- 
bly) are all on the same political side. 
In that same confrontation (according to the Miami Herald of 23 
March 1986) one of  the pro-Contra supporters said: "I'm Jewish, and 
what these people are doing is the same as if  the Nazis were demon-  
strating in Miami Beach". And another participant also compared the 
anti-Contra protest to a Nazi march in a Jewish neighborhood in 
Miami Beach, or to a Ku Klux Klan rally in a black neighborhood. 
That's an extreme comparison, perhaps, but a useful one. Let's think 
in those terms. We, you and I, will have no disagreement about the 
evils of  Nazism, or the nastiness of  racism. So, as an intellectual adven- 
ture with some electricity, let's ask: What  limits are there on the nasti- 
ness of  those nasty folks? In this matter I am as privileged as the person 
quoted in the demonstration; I 'm Jewish too. 
We Americans have some experience in these matters. Ten years ago, 
you will recall, in Skokie, Illinois, - also a very Jewish community, a 
northern suburb of  Chicago - the Nazis planned a march. The Village 
government tried to stop them. The battle became a royal one, even 
reaching the United States Supreme Court. Let's think about the ex- 
tremes of  political speech in that context. In your minds, picture the 
American Nazis, .jerks, square-heads, with uniforms and swastikas and 
placards, planning to march down Collins Avenue, or Washington 
Avenue, on Miami Beach, and then down Fifth St. [My parents, in their 
late years, lived in a condominium at the corner of  Washington and 
Fifth. I remember my mother  saying that when that building opened, a 
new Chapter of  Haddassah came instantly into being!] 
Now, many would say that such a Nazi march should not be per- 
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mitted. They might say: "Look, we recognize the central importance of 
free speach. But free speech is like every other freedom in that it must 
have limits in a good society. The Nazis, saying what they say in the 
way they say it, exceed reasonable limits. Associating themselves with 
the annihilation of millions of Jews, they seek to advance their views, 
abrasively, in a community - Miami Beach - populated by many of 
the same people who had been tortured by Nazis. Some of these Jews, 
after narrow escape, actually sought refuge in this country, in Miami. 
We applaud the vigorous defense of free speech - but this is a case in 
which the constitutional protections of dissident opinions do not 
apply". 
But that position is not sufficient as is stands. Certainly it is true that 
neither the Constitution, nor any sensible principle lying behind it, 
guarantees the right to say anything, anywhere, anytime. But if we are 
going to allow some speech to be restricted, those restrictions must be 
very narrowly drawn, and sustain a heavy burden of justification. So 
the Nazi-blockers [not "anti-Nazis" because that name would apply to 
many who would also protect the right of the Nazis to demonstrate] 
face the task of giving sound argument specifying the proper limits of 
free speech, limits that would be exceeded by the Nazis. I use the case 
of the Nazis precisely because it is as extreme as any I can imagine, and 
therefore the best test for the principles I shall put forward. 
My enterprise, then, is to consider the limits and the arguments the 
Nazi-blockers put forward, and to see if we find them sound. And you 
will join me in this task, I trust. I will do this in six short "chapters". 
Chapter 1. Danger 
Grave danger is the basis of a kind of limit upon speech thought rea- 
sonable by many. You know the famous passage written by Justice 
Holmes in 1919: "The question in every case [he wrote] is whether the 
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature to 
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about substantive 
evils that Congress has a right to prevent" [Schenck v. United States, 249 
US 47 at 52]. Now if the Nazis March on Collins Avenue the dangers 
are patently clear, and arise immediately as they march. So would not 
Justice Holmes's illustration apply? He continued: "The most stringent 
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protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting 
fire in a theater, and causing a panic". Don't Nazis marching in Miami 
Beach, in effect, shout fire in a theater? If their speech is irresponsible, 
why must we permit it? Neither the shouter in the theater, nor the 
Nazi on Collins Avenue (says the Nazi-blocker) is entitled to the con- 
stitutional protection of free speech. 
But the analogy with the theater is in fact not good at all. Whoever 
shouts fire in a theater is certainly not entitled to protection on 
grounds of free speech. But the circumstances of a Nazi demonstration 
differ from those in a theater in three fundamental respects: 
a) The theater audience is captive, subjected against its will to the 
shout and the sequel. Not so any gathering for a Nazi parade. Those 
angered or offended are free to stay away, or to leave; they need have 
nothing to do with it. The panic in the theater traps and injures those 
who had come for reasons entirely unrelated to the shout. What  is rea- 
sonably said in a theater depends, of course, upon what properly goes 
on there - an expectation reasonably imposed upon speech in the 
classroom as well. The shouted false alarm is not essentially speech in 
the theater at all; it is a warning of danger fraudulently given, no dif- 
ferent from the fraudulent ringing of a fire alarm bell. But concerning 
the audience any Nazi march may draw, all of this simply cannot be 
said. 
b) A shouted warning, or false alarm, permits no discussion. It is not 
the expression of opinion, but the signal for flight, giving no oppor- 
tunity for reasoned reply. The other day, in Ann Arbor, some criminal 
fool released a tear gas cannister in a theater! The audience was pre- 
sented with inescapable threat; it had no options. But we who find the 
Nazis hateful do have options; the Nazi demonstration may be an- 
swered with a counter-demonstration, as an anti-Contra demonstra- 
tion may be answered with a pro-Contra demonstration. What  is evil 
may be exposed, refuted, in print or by voice, then or later. Demon- 
strations by bigots, Nazis or others, cannot threaten immediate calam- 
ity at all comparable to a false alarm in a crowded theater. 
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c) The shouted alarm of fire is, by hypothesis, false. We would think 
very differently of an honest warning. No doubt Nazi views are also 
false - but being right is not a condition on which permission to 
demonstrate may be premised. If it were, who will decide who is right 
enough to speak? 
So true enough, there are words in some special circumstances 
which, because of the grave danger they present, cannot claim free 
speech protection - like the shouting of"Fire!" falsely in a theater. But 
a political demonstration, in a park or on a major avenue, is nothing 
like that. 
Chapter 2. Incitement to Riot 
"But [the Nazi-blocker rejoins] you underestimate the seriousness of 
the threat this demonstration would immediately create. If the Nazis 
march with swastikas and brown shirts on Miami Beach they will 
almost certainly provoke a riot. Incitement to riot is a crime. When  it 
is deliberate as in the case we envisage, when its violent consequences 
are highly probable and fully anticipated, such incitement cannot be 
defended as mere speech. It is conduct designed to breach the public 
peace, using the First Amendment as a shield. Citizens of Miami Beach 
have the right, even the duty, to protect themselves from that despi- 
cable design". 
This argument is dangerous. It is often heard, but it seriously mis- 
apprehends the concept of "incitement to riot". That a message or a 
symbol excites an audience to furious antagonism gives no evidence 
whatever of criminal incitement. That crime consists in urging upon 
one's audience the commission of some unlawful act in a context in 
which it is probable that some in the audience will do what is being 
urged. Even then the speaker will not normally be guilty of criminal 
incitement unless persons in his audience do in fact engage in the un- 
lawful conduct he urged upon them. Nothing like these conditions are 
present in the case of a Nazi march in Miami Beach, or an anti-Contra 
demonstration in Miami. In such demonstrations it is usual that 
no specific acts are urged at all, and Nazis are very careful never to 
urge illegal acts. They say things like: "Jews Not Wanted Here!" or, 
"White Power!" or, "America for the White Man!" Some in their 
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audience may then break the law by attacking not the Jews but the 
Nazis themselves - but those whose symbols provoked their fury 
cannot be criminally responsible for that misconduct. 
Incitement must be (and in the law it is) very narrowly delineated. 
When overt unlawful deeds are committed as a direct consequence of 
agitating speech, that speech becomes a part of the crime - as the 
planning of a robbery becomes part of the robbery itsel6 and persons 
whose inflammatory words lead to the very disorder they propose may 
be similarly culpable as part of the deliberate creators of that disorder. 
But Nazis, in Miami Beach, where no one in the audience will be in- 
clined to do anything they may urge, could never be guilty of inciting 
to riot. 
Chapter 3. Incitement and the General Intent to Breach the Peace 
"You may be technically correct [the Nazi-blocker answers] about the 
requirements for that criminal charge, but you are blinded by techni- 
calities. The Nazis delight in creating fright and havoc among Jews. In 
this country, in recent years, their demonstrations have several times 
actually resulted in riot. Nazis understand full well how maddening 
their symbols are to their intended victims; they plan that abrasion. It is 
a good principle in law that one may reasonably be held to intend the 
natural and anticipated consequences of one's acts. True, the riot will 
not be caused by an audience that complies with their urgings, so they 
may be innocent of some technical crime of incitement. They will 
nevertheless be guilty of engaging deliberately in conduct designed to 
infuriate, and calculated to result in a wholesale breach of the public 
peace. Incitement in that more general sense is what we have the right 
to protect ourselves against". 
This argument has much appeal - but I contend that it is pro- 
foundly mistaken. The citizens of Miami Beach, or of Miami or of 
Skokie, may not silence infuriating speakers because of the response 
expected to their words. If they may silence speakers on that ground, 
no truly controversial position on an incendiary topic could be freely 
presented there. For in that case, whenever it could be shown that the 
probable reaction would be intemperate or disorderly, the advocacy of 
an unpopular position would have to be forbidden. Thus tying the per- 
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missibility of controversial speech to its expected reception establishes 
what has been called "the heckler's veto". A decent society, one that 
honors freedom concretely, cannot authorize that veto; it is those who 
respond illegally and violently who must be restrained. 
Very unpopular causes may be as freely advocated under our Con- 
stitution as those in popular favor. Political advocates at the extremes, 
radical or reactionary, wise or crazy, will commonly meet with an 
angry and unruly reception. Communists, pacifists, Nazis, hawks and 
doves - those at the extremes - will be forever in need of defense. 
Their freedom is in our interest not only because our side may one day 
be threatened with similar response, but because rational judgment 
upon any position requires that that position be heard. Some lessons 
must be continually relearned, even by those who once taught them. If 
Nazis are not free to demonstrate because their Jewish audience will be 
hostile, the Jews will not be free to demonstrate when their Arab 
audience [and in Detroit we have a very large Arab-American commu- 
nity] promises equal hostility. When demonstrations to which suf- 
ficient anger may be threatened are not allowed, the hecklers have 
been given the veto - and then they may exercise it no matter what 
the content of their views. 
This issue was fully tested, in our country, in a most interesting 
actual case. In Chicago, in 1949, a passionate message of racial hatred 
was delivered (by a Catholic priest under suspension) to a sizable 
audience in a large hall. Outside, a cordon of police struggled to 
control the infuriated counter-demonstrators, while Father Terminiello 
completed his speech. He was later convicted of creating a breach of 
the peace - a breach actually created not by him or his followers but 
by persons outside the hall, so maddened by his bigotry as to throw 
bottles and bricks at the windows as he spoke. Is Terminiello to be 
punished for speaking so? The judge in the trial Court had instructed 
the jury that the words "breach of the peace" include speech that "stirs 
the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, 
or creates a disturbance..." That, said the Supreme Court of the United 
States, was grave error. Justice Douglas wrote the majority opinion. He 
said: "[One] function of free speech under our system of government is 
to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it 
Free Speech and Political Extremism 271 
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as 
they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and 
challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have 
profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That 
is why freedom of speech, though not absolute .... is nevertheless pro- 
tected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to pro- 
duce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises 
far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest" [Terminiello v. 
City of Chicago, 337 US 1, at 4, 1949]. 
Ironically, the right of a racist to speak thus defended became a bul- 
wark for the freedom of those they reviled. Years later, civil rights 
activists, convicted because of the tumultuous responses of their hostile 
audiences, had their convictions reversed also by the Supreme Court, 
relying on the precedent set in the Terminiello decision. 
The pendulum swings for strong and weak alike. In Miami, in 1986, 
it was the anti-Contra demonstrators who were infuriating to the 
majority, and highly provocative. But in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 
1987, it was the pr0-Contra speakers who were the object of a mad- 
dened attack. I have clipped a photograph from The New York Times of 
a hall at Harvard University, in which a Contra leader, Adolpho 
Calero, was speaking; an anti-Contra demonstrator, believing him a 
devil, is attacking the speaker physically to silence him [NY Times 4 
Oct 87]. Shall we silence Calero for a breach of the peace, or collar that 
young man who does not grasp the point that disagreement, even 
when bitter, does not justify suppression? Plainly he must learn, and we 
must never forget, that even in the most hostile territory the right to 
political agitation for all parties (in our country) has been and will be 
secured. 
And those who would forbid a demonstration before it begins have 
a much weaker case even than those who would convict Calero, or 
Terminiello. For in those cases, the attacks did take place; in the case of 
the envisioned march on Miami Beach, we cannot be certain that in- 
civility and disorder will rule the day. You may recall that in the 
famous Pentagon Papers case, when the United States Government 
argued that the publication of those papers in the New York Times 
would lead to loss of life in Southeast Asia, the Supreme Court held 
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that such an argument (even if the publication were ultimately found 
unlawful) may not serve as a ground for the suppression of the publica- 
tion in advance. If that is true for stolen government papers, is it not all 
the more true in defense of speech in a public, political demonstration? 
Chapter 4. Fighting Words 
"Well [says the Nazi-blocker] it should be grounds for suppression, even 
if it isn't, if the speech in question has a very high probability of pro- 
voking violence. Of course we can't know with absolute certainty that 
a riot will ensue if the Nazis march with swastikas in Miami Beach, but 
we can be pretty confident when we predict it. Some words and 
symbols, by their plain meaning in known contexts, are so provocative 
as to cause decent and reasonable people to respond by fighting. 
Speech like that ]they conclude] is rightly forbidden. 
"And in this [they continue] the Supreme Court is on our side. Some 
years ago, in New Hampshire, a Jehovah's Witness named Chaplinsky 
was convicted, when stopped from preaching in the street, for shouting 
at a policemen thus: 'You are a goddamned racketeer [and] a damned 
fascist and the whole government of Rochester [NH] are fascists or 
agents of fascists'. He claimed freedom of speech as his shield, but the 
Supreme Court held that some utterances are not entitled to normal 
protection. They wrote: '[It] is well understood that the right of free 
speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There 
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise 
any constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the 
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting words" - those 
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an im- 
mediate breach of the peace'" [Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 
568, at 572, 1942]. 
So the Nazi-blocker concludes: "Not protecting 'fighting words' as 
though they were normal political controversy is plain good sense. In a 
community where live thousands of survivors of Nazi death camps, an 
aggressive Nazi demonstration is surely speech which, by its very utter- 
ance, inflicts injury and tends to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace". 
Free Speech and Political Extremism 273 
But this argument simply does not apply to the case of the political 
demonstration here being discussed. 
First, the doctrine, that words may be treated as equivalent to the 
first blows in a fight is highly suspect, and it is a view now almost 
completely abandoned in the courts. What words under what circum- 
stances may be treated so must forever be uncertain and disputable. 
Words that infuriate you may merely amuse me. Words can hurt, 
surely, - but there is a great difference between verbal hurts and 
physical blows. That is why, honoring freedom generally, we place 
freedom of speech in the most protected of arenas. If words that some- 
times provoke a fight are punished because of that danger, the un- 
certainty about which words may have that consequence must chill all 
debate, hedge all robust speaking in a vigorous contest. Words are not 
literal blows; the metaphor must not be allowed to confuse; the theory 
that, in a civil society, nasty words may justify physical retaliation is 
simply not tenable. 
But, second, even if the "fighting words" doctrine had some appro- 
priate application in some contexts, it would have to be so narrowly 
restricted to special circumstances as to have no bearing on a proposed 
demonstration by a political sect or party. It could, at best, be applied 
only to utterances by a specific person to the face of another, being 
defamatory in the extreme. Demonstrations before a general public - 
by the KKK, or the Black Panthers, or the anti-Contras, or the pro- 
Contras - are not one-to-one confrontations however maddening we 
may think their point. 
Third, the doctrine could apply, if ever, only after those personal 
insults had been hurled, and a retaliatory blow struck - never as the 
ground for forbidding a demonstration in advance. 
And finally, if the doctrine were ever applicable, it would certainly 
be restricted to cases of grave, personal offense; it has no application 
where the cause of agitation, however bitter, is political. This "fighting 
words" gambit cannot succeed. 
Chapter 5. Obscenity 
Finally, then, the Nazi-blocker must admit that it is not really harm 
to some persons that motivates him, or danger to all, or incitement 
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to riot, or fighting words, or any such concern. It is the plain evil 
of those Nazi views - the racism and anti-semitism and general stu- 
pidity and bigotry - that he thinks deserves to be silenced. When all 
the other arguments have failed he comes in the end to question the 
principle of free speech itself, asking, in effect, whether that principle 
really does oblige us to protect all content, however damnable. This is 
his last resort. 
"Some speech content [he argues at last] - speech utterly without 
redeeming social value - is not and ought not be protected by the First 
Amendment. Obscenity, of course, is normally associated with sexually 
explicit matter. But its essential, nonsexual characteristics are two: a) it 
is intolerably offensive in some settings; and b) it is totally worthless. 
Whatever may be permitted behind closed doors, there are some 
forms of language, and pictures, and acts - perverted behaviors, sexual 
intercourse - that are not permitted in public places. That prohibition 
is based on the recognition that thrusting specific content of that kind 
upon an unwilling audience in a public place is'a gross imposition, and 
a cause of offense against which that audience, and all of us, have a 
right to be protected. Such obscene matter does not contribute in any 
way to the public forum. It is barren of ideas, and not at all the kind of 
s t u f f -  opinion, argument, information - that the Supreme Court has 
insisted must be protected by our Constitution. 
"Some political garbage - like that of the Nazis and the KKK, 
although not in the same way carnal, is just like that. Citizens of a 
decent community have a right to be shielded from it in precisely that 
spirit. Indeed, lascivious acts or pictures are offensive, but not nearly as 
offensive as some irrational racism, or anti-semitism. So we contend 
[the Nazi-blocker continues] that in a wide but accurate sense of the 
term, hate-mongering like that of the Nazis is obscene. As that cate- 
gory is used now in the law, the term might not apply. But it is still not 
an unreasonable stretch of language, or of concept, to prohibit Nazi 
speech on the same fundamental grounds". 
And that is what it comes to, that is what all censorship comes to, in 
the end: some content is thought so very bad that it must not be heard 
or seen. I call this argument "the outrage override". With this we get to 
the root of" the conflict between the blocker and the civil libertarian. 
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The blocker believes in his heart that some things may be suppressed 
because the content of the views expressed are simply intolerable, 
"beyond the pale". The libertarian believes in his heart that giving to 
any the power to silence what they do not think it worthy to hear is 
more intolerable still. That is why Nazis and other racists provide a 
good illustrative case. Their views are thought manifestly worthless, 
and that is not in dispute - but they are laden with ideas. Of  course 
some of  those ideas are despicable, but sometimes .just for that reason 
they are meaningful. No segment of society, I argue, is entitled to 
decide for the rest of us that some ideas are so lacking in worthy con- 
tent that we will have no opportunity to evaluate them for ourselves. 
Even where the matter in question has no political content, and is 
sexually explicit, and is known to give offense to some, we protect the 
freedom of others to see or hear it by obliging those who are offended 
to shield themselves by turning it off, or turning away, or walking 
away. That was the very issue faced by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in another case - a Florida case, in fact [Erznoznick v. 
City of JacksonvilIe, 422 US 205 at 207, 1975]. The objectionable matter 
in question appeared on a drive-in movie screen, showing X-rated 
films, and viewable from a road in the distance. But when it is possible 
for a viewer or hearer to turn away, said the Court, his being offended 
when he does not do so will not serve to cancel the rights of others to 
speak, or to listen or to watch. 
Justice Powell, recently retired from the Court, wrote the majority 
opinion in Erznoznick, saying, in part:. "When the government, acting 
as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds 
of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the 
First Amendment strictly limits its power.... [R]estrictions have been 
upheld only when the speaker intrudes upon the privacy of the 
home ... or the degree of captivity [of the audience] makes it im- 
practical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure" 
(p. 209). 
And sometimes the garbage is inextricably mixed with other stuff 
that deserves a hearing. In yet another case, in which a young man in a 
courthouse wearing a jacket with words on it ["Fuck the draft"] that I 
find uncomfortable to repeat in public, but words having a political 
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message too, was arrested for obscene display, the Supreme Court  
vindicated h im in the end: 
The ability of Government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse 
solely to protect others from hearing it is... dependent upon a showing that sub- 
stantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any 
broader view of this authority would effectively empower a majority to silence dis- 
sidents simply as a matter of personal predilections [Cohen v. California 403 US 15, 
at 21; 1971]. 
So we have to ask: is the extreme political speech in question (say, 
the Nazi garbage) an invasion o f  the privacy o f  the citizens? Generally 
it is not. A Nazi march down Collins Avenue - or one by the anti- 
Contras on Biscayne Blvd. - would surely not be. Streets and parks are 
the c o m m o n  and proper places for for political assembly. To some 
degree we cannot avoid encountering what  happens in such places - 
but we do not have to stay, and we cannot expect to be insulated by law 
from all that we find intensely objectionable. 
Justice Powell [in Erznoznick] continues: 
The plain, if at time disquieting truth is that in our pluralistic society, constandy 
proliferating new and ingenious forms of expression, "we are inescapably captive 
audiences for many purposes." ... Much that we encounter offends our aesthetic, if 
not our political and moral sensibilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not 
permit government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are suf- 
ficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer. Rather, 
absent the narrow circumstances described above [in which exposure is entirely im- 
possible to avoid] the burden normally falls upon the viewer to 'avoid further 
bombardment of his sensibilities simply by averting his eyes' [422 US 210.] .... The 
limited privacy interests of persons on the public streets cannot justify.., censorship 
of otherwise protected speech on the basis of its content. 
"Well, [comes the last try f rom the Nazi-blocker] is this Nazi 
garbage 'otherwise protected speech'? Have we not agreed that it is 
utterly worthless, and offensive, and is it therefore not  like hard-core 
obscenity, unentitled to protection? If so, we are justified in prohibit- 
ing it". 
But  it is not, not  at all. The  right o f  the public to see and hear Nazis, 
or Communists,  or Contras, or anti-Contras, or any political view, 
however extreme, is at least as compelling as the right to read risque 
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literature or look at bare breasts and buttocks on the screen. Even with 
respect to pornography, simply because some materials lack redeeming 
social value - whatever that is - does not .justify prohibition. For 
material having any political content whatever, that argument could 
not possibly apply, and could not possibly be applied fairly. 
Chapter 6. Conclusion 
What then shall we conclude about political extremism and free 
speech? Are there any restrictions, of any kind, that may be applied to 
such speaking? Of  course there are! The speaking that is bridled with 
criminal acts does become part of those later deeds. And, apart from 
criminality, there are reasonable restrictions that may be enforced 
upon the manner of speaking, and the place of it, and the time of it. We 
may permit rallies in the parks, and yet reserve some quiet arboretum 
as a place where no political demonstrations may be held. We may 
respect political demonstrations on downtown streets - and yet hold 
that, during the rush hours, political demonstrations will create more 
inconvenience than is tolerable. Or we may, as a community, protect 
residential streets from noisy demonstrations. The places may be 
restricted, the times may be restricted - and the manner too, eliminat- 
ing, say, all electronic megaphones and super-noisy amplification. We 
may, within the rules, impose such regulations - but, and this is the 
key, we may not do so selectively. The restriction of  manner or place that 
applies to one view applies to all. It may be unlawful to post stickers on 
public walls - but that applies to all stickers, not just those of the un- 
favored minority. And what we permit for the politics in wide favor - 
say, a march on Main Street -- we must permit for the nastiest of the 
unfavored. By content we must, in a free society, make no exceptions. 
Freedom is not merely for those we can tolerate; it is for all. 
Finally, then, please note: Robust, wide open political debate, un- 
inhibited political debate, in parks and streets and lecture halls, is going 
to rouse anger, and give offense. Some public offensiveness, and some 
private distress, will be an inevitable cost of freedom. That is what a 
free, democratic society requires. It is not simply the kooks whom we 
protect, but ourselves. Citizens who would govern themselves - we - 
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have the right to hear every opinion on our public business. The Nazis 
may be crazy, or vicious, but that does not cancel our need to pass 
judgment upon them; therefore the opportunity to hear them must be 
protected, partly in their interest, but mainly in ours. 
And we cannot make exceptions for the specially nasty bits. Some 
say: "OK then, let them speak - but not with their infernal Swastika!" 
But if the Swastika is too offensive for some to tolerate today, the Star 
of David will be claimed equally intolerable by others tomorrow. 
So, I say, the Nazis have the same right to sing the "Hort Wessel 
Lied ~, that others have to sing the "Internationale", and still others ~We 
Shall Overcome". To the claim that some stuff is just too nasty to 
permit, I answer: no degree of nastiness can justify silencing speech in a 
free society. 
Even on Miami Beach for the Nazis? And even in Miami for the 
anti-Contras? Yes, the effectiveness of political protest often depends 
critically upon the symbolic use of location. When the Nazis planned 
to demonstrate in Skokie ten years ago, whatever we may think of 
them, that location, being heavily Jewish, was part of their point. Civil 
rights demonstrators, as part of their point often carried their moral 
convictions, very offensive to the segregationist majority, to the heart 
of Jim Crow country -- to Selma, Alabama, and Philadelphia, Missis- 
sippi. Blacks who demonstrate for fair housing opportunities often do 
so in the heart of middle-class suburban communities that would ex- 
clude them. The Nazis carry signs reading "White Power". If we do not 
permit them to do that in black neighborhoods, how can we justify 
Black Panthers carrying signs saying "Black Power" in white neighbor- 
hoods? 
But the civil rights marchers carried a message of human equality 
and decency; the swastika is the symbol of unspeakable indecency. Yes. 
But that judgment of contents cannot be made antecedently, and can 
have no bearing upon the right to speak publicly. Our best hope that 
sound judgment will be passed upon nasty political views lies in the 
freedom of all to hear them, and the freedom of all to speak and write 
in reply. 
I conclude: We learn from the extreme case. The Nazis, by present- 
ing a case about as extreme as any we can conjure up, provide us with 
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an instructive test o f  our own principles. These are powerful  principles, 
and sound ones; they are a tribute to our own civility, and - if  I may 
be permit ted to end on a slightly corny note - one o f  the most  deeply 
satisfying marks o f  our own national culture, o f  which I am very 
proud. 
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